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ABSTRACT
European countries have been required to formulate a national preference in
relation to the EU Financial Transaction Tax. The two leading approaches to
explaining how the ﬁnancial sector makes its views felt in the political process
– the structural power of the ﬁnancial services sector based on potential
disinvestment, and its instrumental power arising from direct political
lobbying – fall short of providing a comprehensive account. The missing link
is how and why policy-makers might be willing to adopt the priorities of key
sectors of the ﬁnancial services industry. We outline how three levels of
ideational power might be at work in shaping outcomes, using Ireland as a
case study. We argue that background systems of shared knowledge that are
institutionalised in policy networks generated broad ideational convergence
between the ﬁnancial sector and policymakers, creating a policy paradigm
over the priorities of industrial policy in general. Against that backdrop,
debate over speciﬁc policy choices (policy instruments and policy settings)
can leave room for a wider range of disagreement and indeed political and
ideational contestation. Irish policymakers proved responsive to industry
interests in the case of the FTT, but not for the reasons normally given.
KEYWORDS Ideational power; national preferences; policy choice; FTT; Ireland
Introduction: how did Irish policy-makers come to oppose the
FTT?
A Europe-wide Financial Transaction Tax (FTT) was one of the ﬁrst measures to
be proposed for advancement through voluntary ‘enhanced cooperation’
among member states. This permits us to focus on a key topic on contempor-
ary comparative political economy, that is, the power of the ﬁnancial sector in
shaping national policy, not only in the domestic political context but also
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against the backdrop of EU-wide policy discourses. The argument of this
paper is that our understanding of the mechanisms through which structural
and instrumental power may be converted into political inﬂuence continues
to be problematic. The ﬁnancial services sector can command a lot of struc-
tural power to secure its interests. It also exercised instrumental power
through active lobbying at European level against proposals for the FTT, build-
ing coalitions with other industry actors on a transnational basis and overtly
playing upon European policy makers’ perceptions of governments’ structural
dependence on ﬁnance (Kalaitzake 2017; Kastner 2017). Nonetheless, ten EU
member states declared themselves to be in favour of the FTT. But how were
industry preferences conveyed to national policy-makers, and how might
public policy preferences come to adopt the priorities of the ﬁnancial sector?
Drawing on Carstensen and Schmidt (2016), we supplement structural and
instrumental approaches with an ideational and discursive explanatory
approach. Taking the case study of Ireland, we note the convergence of the
preferences of the ﬁnancial sector and the policy oﬃcials against the FTT.
The ﬁnancial sector opposed the FTT for familiar reasons. But we ﬁnd that
the motivations of the oﬃcial side cannot be fully accounted for by either
structural or instrumental explanations. We argue that national policy out-
comes were shaped through discursive convergence that took place
through a well-institutionalised network linking state and business interests
together. This is not inconsistent with noting that the oﬃcial side also has
scope for autonomous policy choices on particular issues, even to the
extent of overtly opposing industry preferences in some instances. An idea-
tional explanation of policy contestation ﬁlls the explanatory gap between
ﬁnancial sector preferences and the outcome of the policy process.
The paper is organised as follows. Part 2 outlines the current state-of-the-
art on ﬁnancial power and summarises our analytical framework about how
power is exercised through ideas. Part 3 discusses the inconclusiveness of
structural and empirical explanations of Ireland’s opposition to the FTT and
shows where the explanatory gap lies. Section 4 sets out the background to
the policy considerations motivating the Irish oﬃcial sector, showing how
ideational explanation provide us with the missing causal mechanism.
Section 5 sets out the evidence supporting our interpretation, drawing on
wide-ranging interviews with key respondents in the industry and in oﬃcial
policy world, conducted in June and July 2017 (see the Appendix for
details). The ﬁnal section draws together the conclusions and considers
implications.
Ideas and ﬁnancial power
The ﬁnancial sector enjoys considerable structural power in market econom-
ies due to the threat of disinvestment and the mutual dependence between
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the state and the ﬁnancial sector. Politicians rely on the ﬁnancial sector for
growth in the economy – as new investment requires capital availability –
and the ﬁnancial sector relies on politicians to provide a favourable regulatory
environment. However, the translation of structural power into eﬀective
inﬂuence over policy-making priorities is not necessarily automatic and can
be contingent on other features of the political and organisational
environment.
Three important aspects of contingent power have been identiﬁed. Firstly,
ﬁnance typically prefers to exercise ‘quiet power’ based on its structural
advantages. But if issues become politically salient, beyond the range of
their direct inﬂuence and played out in the democratic political arena, they
may need to deploy instrumental power through lobbying, and by seeking
to shape public opinion directly (Culpepper 2010, 2015; Kastner 2017). Sec-
ondly, the ﬁnancial industry itself is not monolithic and can face its own col-
lective action problems (James and Quaglia 2018; Kus 2016). Thirdly,
institutional access can be variable. Tsingou makes the case that club-like gov-
ernance brings regulators and the ﬁnance industry together and renders pol-
icymakers receptive to industry interests (Tsingou 2015). But this may not
always be eﬀective. Policy actors on the oﬃcial side may become less recep-
tive to the preferences of the ﬁnance industry because they are required to be
more attuned to electorally-driven priorities (James and Quaglia 2018).
These considerations about the contingent power of ﬁnance have contrib-
uted signiﬁcantly to our understanding of the challenges that can arise in the
gaps between ﬁnance and politics, the capacity for collective action of the
ﬁnancial sector, and the receptivity of the state institutions. They also point
to a further aspect of power, which is that the politics of interest and
inﬂuence is played out within a framework of ideas involving assumptions
about the costs and beneﬁts of alternative course of action, what is feasible
politically, and what is acceptable in terms of electoral legitimacy. In other
words, power is also exercised through the ideas that are in play about how
the world works.
In this paper, we propose that ideas are a major mediating factor in
accounting for outcomes that are favourable or unfavourable to the ﬁnance
industry. Carstensen and Schmidt identify three mechanisms in the exercise
of ideational power (Carstensen and Schmidt 2016). Firstly, power ‘through’
ideas involves persuasion through coordinative and communicate discourse,
often actively undertaken by a policy entrepreneur to get an issue or a priority
onto the political agenda. Secondly, power ‘over’ ideas is the capacity to
control the meaning of ideas the terms of discourse. Dominant actors may
be able to impose their preferred interpretations and meaning on others
and to exclude alternatives. Contestation for inﬂuence over the prevailing
ideational framework is entirely possible here. Subordinate or weaker actors
such as civil society actors, community organisations, and non-governmental
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organisations, may nonetheless work as ‘policy entrepreneurs’ try to modify
the prevailing terms of discourse and to appeal to a normative framework
that will result in shaming their adversaries. Finally, power ‘in’ ideas refers
the institutionalisation of certain ideas at the expense of others and a wide-
spread acceptance of what is normal that is ‘constituted by systems of knowl-
edge, discursive practices and institutional setups’ (Carstensen and Schmidt
2016: 329).
This framework helps us identify an explanatory puzzle over how and why
policy actors (government ministers, public service and public agency
oﬃcials) might adopt the priorities of ﬁnance. There is an explanatory gap
between arguments based on structural and instrumental power on the
one hand, and the outcome of interest on the other. James and Quaglia
demonstrate that shifts in political priorities and changes in organisational
and institutional conditions can disrupt the eﬀectiveness of structural and
instrumental power advantages of ﬁnance, downgrading of the ﬁnancial
sector’s ability to frame the discourse over the terms on which Brexit might
be settled (James and Quaglia 2018). In the case considered here concerning
the Irish state’s decision not to participate in the FTT, we suggest that the idea-
tional position of the government enabled an upgrading of the inﬂuence of
the ﬁnancial sector.
How then do the preferences of the ﬁnance industry come to be taken up
by policy actors and eventually prevail in the political sphere? While reﬂecting
on Carstensen and Schmidt’s categorisation of ideational power to the world
of policy-making, it may also be useful to remember Hall’s model of para-
digms in the policy process (Hall 1993). Firstly, Hall posited that the contesta-
tion of ideas may involve disagreement over the settings of the instruments
used to implement standard policy models in order to achieve agreed
policy goals. Secondly, the policy instruments may themselves be brought
into challenge. Thirdly, the most extensive level of ideational contestation
may involve a wholesale challenge to the policy paradigm itself.
We can then envisage diﬀerent levels of ideational alignment between
powerful interests (in our case, the ﬁnancial sector) and the state (the policy
actors involved in policy making and implementation in the ﬁeld of industry,
ﬁnance, and revenue, among others); and we may envisage these as being
worked out at diﬀerent layers of policy contestation. Notably, we allow
space at each layer of the policy paradigm for contestation by diﬀerent
actors and for alternative ideational constructions to be deployed about
the policy choices that are under review. The ideational background to the
structural and instrumental power of ﬁnance can be analytically set out as
in Table 1 below.
At the most fundamental level we can model a shared set of cognitive and
normative assumptions about the on which market societies operate. This is
the shared paradigmatic framework that makes it possible for ﬁnance to
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exercise structural power. More speciﬁcally, broad political consensus privile-
ging a particular growth model can itself be understood as a policy paradigm
that sets the framework of engagement between political actors. In the Irish
case, the long-standing model of tax-incentivised FDI-led growth can be
seen to have just such a dominant or paradigmatic signiﬁcance in economic
debate (Barry 2003; Brazys and Regan 2017). Where the terms on which the
market economy functions are not fundamentally challenged, the ready trans-
lation of the preferences of ﬁnance into policy implementation may be rela-
tively unproblematic: this is Implication A in Table 1. A second option arises
when issues become politically salient and ﬁnance can no longer rely on
the ‘quiet’ power they prefer, out of the political spotlight (Culpepper 2010).
This is where civil society actors may become involved and vocal, and
public opinion takes heed of the issue such that political actors are required
to respond to their electorates. The scope for overlapping policy preferences
between policy actors and ﬁnancial interests is reduced, as suggested in Impli-
cation B. Lower-salience issues to do with details of policy design (the ‘set-
tings’ of the policy instruments, in Hall’s terms) and indeed policy
implementation may still be of great signiﬁcance for ﬁnance, which may
well expend a great deal of eﬀort to inﬂuence the outcome. But the location
of inﬂuence may well move out of the electoral and political arena and is more
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likely in that case to be settled on terms favourable to ﬁnance, as in Impli-
cation C.
We also recognise, of course, that the power can be exercised in diﬀerent
arenas and using diﬀerent and even all resources simultaneously (or indeed
that there may be a temporal sequencing of types and locales of inﬂuence).
As Carstensen and Schmidt note, ‘coercive, institutional, and ideational’
uses of power are not insulated from each other in real political contexts (Car-
stensen and Schmidt 2018: 2). But the analytical framework can help us clarify
some important potential channels of inﬂuence nonetheless.
The European ﬁnancial transaction tax (FTT) in Ireland
We draw on the framework set out in Table 1 to explore the case study in
question, that is, the Irish government’s decision to reject participation in
the FTT. Structural and instrumental explanations of Ireland’s opposition to
the FTT do not take the argument all the way home. Our aim in this section
is to show where the explanatory gap lies and to provide a better account
of the outcome.
The FTT is an important initiative in response to the global ﬁnancial crisis.
Initially proposed at the height of the crisis in 2011, it is aimed at capital
markets (equities, debt securities, and derivatives), and applies only to the sec-
ondary market (where the primary market includes the ﬁrst-time issuance of
equities, bonds, and derivatives). The rate at which the tax is set is very low
(0.1% on securities and 0.01% on derivatives), but it would be expected to
yield signiﬁcant sums on high-frequency transactions. The tax was designed
to be collected on the basis of residence and issuance principles, requiring
trading ﬁrms to pay it to the ﬁrst-issuer country of the shares or derivatives.
The FTT was intended to do three things. Firstly, it had a regulatory dimen-
sion and was intended to disincentivise excessive ﬁnancial sector volatility,
although repo markets came to be excluded, reducing its potential reach
into shadow banking (Braun 2018; Gabor 2016). Secondly, it was supposed
to yield a valuable revenue stream from proﬁtable sectors of ﬁnance, in the
wake of the expensive taxpayer bailouts of commercial banks. Thirdly, it
was intended to harmonise ﬁnancial taxation across member states. EU
member-state opinion on the initiative was divided, but as the measure
obtained more than the minimum number of nine member-states supporting
it, the plan was that it should proceed as an ‘enhanced cooperation’ measure.
Final agreement is still pending at the time of writing.
The ﬁnancial sector in Ireland may be assumed to be able to exercise ‘struc-
tural’ power because of its signiﬁcance for the Irish economy. The structural
weight of the sector is considerable, since the ﬁnancial services sector is a sig-
niﬁcant employer and a major contributor to export earnings. The contri-
bution of ﬁnancial services to Irish economic growth is heavily concentrated
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in the professional support services they require, principally the legal and
accountancy activities supporting these ﬁrms: ﬁnancial ﬁrms themselves can
avail of various preferential tax provisions. Moreover, notwithstanding the
assertions by Irish government oﬃcials in interview that the regulatory frame-
work was much tightened since 2010, the funds industry operates in a lightly-
regulated environment. Policy oﬃcials are highly responsive to ﬁrms’ views
about the adverse eﬀects of regulatory compliance requirements (a point
conﬁrmed by many of our interviewees). Looking at the contribution of
ﬁnancial services to exports, jobs, and gross value added in the economy,
Table 2 shows that Ireland’s ﬁnancial services sector ranks among the top
three in Europe (along with the Netherlands and the UK, excluding the
unusual case of Luxembourg).1
There appears to be a strong correlation between the presence of a large
funds sector in an economy and that country’s opposition to the FTT. EU
countries tended to vote in line with the size and signiﬁcance of their
ﬁnancial sector. Countries with large ﬁnancial sectors such as the UK, Luxem-
bourg, and Ireland opposed the initiative; countries with smaller ﬁnancial
sectors (measured by the percentage of employment in the ﬁnance industry,
the number of registered funds, and the contribution to GDP) were favourable
and expressed their intention to participate in the enhanced cooperation.
Table 3 shows that Ireland has an exceptionally large number of managed
funds or hedge funds, second only to the UK.
However, even when the structural explanation is taken at its face value,
the estimates of the costs and beneﬁts of an FTT are ambiguous. Diﬀerent




(% of value added)
Share of ﬁnancial services exports
(% of total services
exports)
Employment in the ﬁnancial sector
(% of total employment)
Luxembourg 26.62 61.60 18.2
Netherlands 7.39 3.84 2.72
UK 7.24 29.77 3.35
Ireland 6.31 17.55 4.05
Belgium 6.28 8.17 1.11
Italy 5.70 6.47 2.80
Portugal 5.42 1.81 0.80
France 4.48 7.42 1.18
Slovakia 4.34 3.35 0.84
Austria 4.23 5.37 3.60
Slovenia 4.16 2.35 1.10
Germany 4.06 13.20 1.45
Estonia 3.96 1.80 0.71
Spain 3.92 4.75 0.76
Finland 2.85 2.10 0.81
Sources: GVA – OECD (2017) value added by activity: ﬁnance and insurance share of ﬁnancial services
exports – World Bank (2017); Insurance and ﬁnancial services (% of service exports, BoP) (World Bank
2017); Employment in the ﬁnancial sector – OECD (2017) Population and employment by economic
activity (OECD 2017).
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estimates exist of potential revenue yields. A report commissioned by govern-
ment, jointly undertaken by the Central Bank and the independent Economic
and Social Research Institute (ESRI), concluded that ‘the FTT could raise
approximately €490–730 million in revenue for Ireland’ as opposed to
almost €182 million yielded by the existing Stamp Duty (Central Bank of
Ireland and ESRI 2012: 2). The authors cautioned that those predictions
were subject to uncertainty: they warned that such a tax might change the
behaviour of market actors, for example by reducing the number of trans-
actions and market activity, which would then result in lower yields from
the FTT (Central Bank of Ireland and ESRI 2012). They also suggested that
The relocation of a small number of ﬁrms who account for a large share of the
total volume of equity and bond transactions which would be subject to the tax
would reduce the estimated gross tax yield by 83 to 85 per cent (Central Bank of
Ireland and ESRI 2012: 3).
The potential beneﬁts were fully acknowledged, but on balance the Central
Bank and ESRI advised against the FTT, mostly on foot of the uncertainty of
the projected revenue yield due to the unknown risk of ﬁrms relocating
elsewhere.
On the other hand, Collins (2016), writing for the principal trade-union
think tank NERI (the Nevin Economic Research Institute), argued that the
net annual yield of the EU FTT would very likely be between €320 and €350
million, even after the abolition of Stamp Duty and the possibility of a
reduced volume of transactions. The estimated revenue yield would still be
double the yield of the Stamp Duty. Drawing on European Commission
reports, the risk of capital ﬂight was downplayed (Irish Congress of Trade
Unions 2012: 4–8). A relatively small proportion of the securities that are
traded in the secondary market are issued from Dublin, but due to the
Table 3. Number of hedge funds and support for FTT.
















Sources: European Central Bank, city of London report (European Central Bank 2014).
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issuance principle, Dublin-based ﬁrms would be obliged to pay the trans-
action tax on trades conducted in countries that were party to the FTT
anyway, even if Ireland were not to sign up for the FTT. And even if the behav-
iour of the actors were to change following the enactment of the EU FTT, the
securities trade is much less volatile than the derivatives market, on which a
lower level of tax is applied.
Thus there was scope for genuine uncertainty about the impact of the FTT
on the Irish economy. The explanatory gap concerns why Irish policymakers
opted to converge on the preferences of the ﬁnancial services industry
(which unequivocally opposed the FTT from the outset). This now needs to
be understood in terms of the ideas that were in play.
Our explanatory model suggests that policy actors share a paradigmatic
framework with the ﬁnancial sector to do with the terms of engagement
with market economies. In the Irish case, this involves a deep-seat commit-
ment by the state to an industrial development strategy based on promoting
FDI, principally through tax incentives. This reinforces the link between the
diﬀerent dimensions of the policy debate. State actors are motivated by par-
ticularly strong priorities that strengthen the bargaining hand of the ﬁnancial
sector. This is captured by Implication A in Table 1.
But this should not be understood as pure coercive power ‘over’ ideas. As
indicated in Implication B in Table 1, if an issue is mobilised into public debate,
the outcome is moot. Issue salience disrupts ‘quiet politics’. Once politicians
are obliged to respond to public opinion on a speciﬁc policy issue, the prior
tacit understandings are no longer necessarily decisive. Ireland’s rejection of
the FTT presents us with a least-likely case for investigating ideational
power, precisely because structural and instrumental explanations seem to
do a lot of explanatory work. But something is still missing in the explanation:
how can we most convincingly join up the dots between structural conditions
and political outcomes?
The policy framework of economic development in Ireland
We now turn to the background policy considerations motivating the Irish
oﬃcial sector, showing how ideational explanation provide us with the
missing explanatory mechanism.
In Ireland, the key to understanding the ﬁnancial services industry is to see
it in the context of the long-standing Irish state project of maintaining a low
corporation tax rate to build economic development through attracting
foreign direct investment (FDI). At the centre of this strategy is a remarkable
state institution, the Industrial Development Authority (IDA), wielding an enor-
mous amount of ‘soft power’. Its role is highly activist and interventionist, tar-
geting and cultivating potential investors. It goes further: it also plays a
signiﬁcant role in arranging local site visits, helping investors to acquire real
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estate and source trained staﬀ, enabling networking with key state actors, and
more besides (Breznitz 2012; Ó Riain 2004).
In the mid-1980s, the IDA moved into a new phase of activism, targeting
the emergent industrial sectors of information and communications technol-
ogy, pharmaceuticals, and medical devices. The payoﬀ in jobs and exports was
impressive, and this formed the basis of the export-led phase of the Celtic
Tiger in super-normal, catch-up growth during the 1990s (Honohan and
Walsh 2002; MacSharry and White 2000). The International Financial Services
Sector (IFSC), an umbrella public-private-partnership vehicle dating from this
era, was a political project from the outset. It was driven by the Department of
the Taoiseach, the Department of Finance, the Industrial Development Auth-
ority, and (initially) the Central Bank with the aim of generating a competitive
ﬁnancial services sector from a very limited base. This was motivated by
nationalist ambitions to bring about economic recovery against the bleak
backdrop of very high unemployment and emigration during the 1980s (inter-
view 7). The IFSC would regenerate the run-down city-centre Docklands area
by extending the FDI tax and investment incentives regime to internationally
traded ﬁnancial services, though location-speciﬁc policy rules were later
relaxed (Interviews 2, 5). Over a period of some thirty years Ireland developed
a lucrative ﬁnancial services sector employing up to 40,000 people (in a work-
force of about two million).
The importance of FDI in the Irish growth model, and the speciﬁc place for
the ﬁnancial sector within this model, privileges its concerns in the eyes of
government and in the priorities of the IDA. The extent of political consensus
around the build-up of Ireland’s export-led growth model is the source of the
convergence between the government policies and industry interests. Alter-
nating governments exhibit no fundamental partisan diﬀerences on this
development strategy: hence its paradigmatic status. The state institutions
(especially the IDA) and the public bureaucracy therefore encounter very
little ideational or ideological challenge to their prevailing conceptions stem-
ming from changes in ministerial portfolios. The ﬁrst element of Hall’s account
of a policy paradigm, that is, the broad goals of the policy itself, is virtually
unchallenged, and there is little basis for party-political electoral mobilisation
on the matter.
These shared policy priorities are further institutionalised through the con-
sultative forum that brings together representatives of the industry and of the
state sector. The International Financial Services (IFS) Industry Advisory Com-
mittee (IAC), often referred to as the Financial Services Industry Group, is a
structured consultative body through which industry priorities are relayed
to policy-makers, similar to industry corporatist bodies in other countries
including the UK. The IAC High-Level Implementation Group is made up of
twelve members: politicians and senior civil servants from the core economic
and revenue divisions; the IDA; representatives from various branches of the
JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY 1609
ﬁnancial services industry; and the main accountancy and tax advisory ﬁrms
(Irish Financial Services 2017). It was central to developing Ireland’s long-
term strategy for ﬁnancial services (Department of Finance 2017).
The institutional framework should not be seen merely as a transmission
belt for the ﬁnancial services industry to convey its preferences into the
heart of government and of public policy. But the structures do generate
additional scope for power ‘over’ ideas and ‘club governance’ as indicated
in Implication C in Table 1. The IAC provides an arena within which the
market-conforming preferences of the industry on the one side, and the econ-
omic development priorities of the state oﬃcials on the other, can ﬁnd
common ground – the politics of normalising ideational outlooks as
‘common sense’.
The Irish ﬁnancial services sector includes standard mainstream activities
such as pensions funds, insurance, retail banks. The growth areas have
been in managed funds and Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs), particularly
since the liberalisation of tax treatment of Structured Financial Funds. Finan-
cial Vehicle Corporations (FVCs) play a particularly important role in securitisa-
tion, including in relation to income assets such as residential mortgages.
There were 875 of these in summer 2017, and almost a thousand other
SPVs, many of which were incentivised through tax beneﬁts to enter the
Irish market because of the scale of proﬁts to be gained from holding property
loans acquired in Ireland following the ﬁnancial crisis (Brennan ‘Irish special
purpose vehicle assets reach €763bn’ 2017a). Financialisation of this sort bur-
geoned, largely free of either national or international oversight. Regulation of
the shadow-banking sector was slow to catch up with the volume of activity it
generated: ‘Central Bank data is inconsistent with revenue data and has
resulted in regulatory gaps’ (Stewart and Doyle 2017: 396).
EU initiatives have tightened the regulatory apparatus in recent years. Most
hedge fund activity is now regulated by the authorities in Ireland or elsewhere,
and the Alternative Investment Funds Managers Directive (AIFMD) 2011,
among other EU schemes, has extended the scope of ﬁnancial regulation
deeper into the shadow banking sector. But the international scale of
ﬁnance and the complexity of regulatory jurisdictions demand much more
active monitoring and international coordination than national oversight
agencies can normallymuster (Griﬃn and Brennan 2016). There is still consider-
able scope for international regulatory and tax arbitrage, and the Irish ﬁnancial
services sector has become a signiﬁcant player in exactly this ﬁeld (Brennan
‘Russia’s growing banking crisis to hit IFSC vehicles, experts warn’ 2017b).
For or against the FTT?
There was a wide-ranging civil society campaign in favour of the FTT; the
ﬁnancial services industry opposed it; the government initially kept an open
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mind and then came down against it. What accounts for the eventual govern-
ment outcome?
The pro-FTT campaigners
Support for Ireland’s adoption of the FTT was led by the ‘Robin Hood Tax’ cam-
paign, driven by a coalition of over 40 leading civil society and trade union
organisations under the umbrella term ‘Claiming Our Future’. This coalition
is committed to tax justice, distributive justice, environmental concerns, and
justice in global as well as national developmental priorities. Considerable
energy was committed to publicising the issues surrounding the FTT and
building the credibility of the campaign, the better to boost public support
and gain the attention of the policy establishment. Among the coalition’s
initiatives, they commissioned a report from reputable policy analysts that
was intended to make a strong mainstream economic case for the FTT and
to counter the inﬂuence of the Central Bank and ESRI report (Central Bank
of Ireland and ESRI 2012; Collins 2016). Its website featured a prominent
display of pro-FTT quotes from European politicians including Angela
Merkel and François Hollande. It organised public meetings, public gatherings,
and other events. It acted as a typical ‘policy entrepreneur’, trying to change
the terms of discourse to advance its cause and drawing on normative as well
as analytical resources (Irish Congress of Trade Unions 2012). The risk of disin-
vestment, activists argued, should not be a compelling consideration: ‘for
each argument they bring up, which is always “London, they will all go to
London”, we brought up mainly other European countries that are joining
the FTT, they are not leaving. So why would they leave Ireland?’ (Interview 9).
However, despite these eﬀorts, the campaign was able to gain little traction
within the political process. Only the small leftist parties openly supported its
aims, while none of the mainstream parties of centre-right or centre-left
would do so. Its leaders found it diﬃcult to get access to consultative pre-
Budget meetings with Department of Finance oﬃcials.
In essence, the civil society ideational mobilisers lost the battle of ideas: ‘we
are struggling to ﬁnd the arguments in terms of countering all the myths that
have been repeated’ (Interview 9). They were keenly aware of the market-
centred ideas prevalent among Irish policymakers: ‘there is an ideology in
Ireland, a mainstream one, and the FTT might not properly ﬁt in there as
market regulation’ (Interview 9). They could not frame their case in a way
that gained suﬃcient credibility with those committed to the paradigmatic
framework of FDI-led, tax-incentivised economic growth. They could not
then appeal to a ‘politics of common knowledge’ among policy-makers and
protestors that would give them legitimacy and access (Culpepper 2008).
But neither could they credibly sustain a discourse around an alternative
value-system that would ‘shame’ the dominant voices in the debate. Polling
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data conﬁrm that public opinion in Ireland was, on average, less receptive to
the Robin Hood Campaign arguments than was the case in other European
countries (Eurobarometer 2012).2 The civil society pro-FTT activists could
not bring about the political salience required to put serious pressure on
the government.
The ﬁnancial services sector
The ﬁnancial services industry opposed FTT proposals from the outset. A
ﬁnancial services derivatives sales trader argues that Ireland signing up to
FTT would ‘distort the market’ (Interview 1). Another ﬁnancial consultant
argues that the FTT is a normatively and politically driven project intended
to punish the ﬁnancial sector and that it is not in line with ‘economic realities’
(Interview 4). Others depicted it as damaging to economic performance –
interestingly, not as potentially triggering disinvestment and relocation of
existing ﬁrms, but because it would introduce uncertainty in the tax regime
that could aﬀect future investment decisions: ‘It has to be very clear in
terms of what authorisation standards are, timelines are, when there are regu-
latory obligations on ﬁrms, and what they are’ (Interview 13).
It has proven diﬃcult to track empirical mechanisms through which the
industry may have conveyed its preferences to government, whether in
terms of the exercise of structural or of instrumental power. In interview,
representatives of individual ﬁrms, advisory ﬁrms, and the industry’s overall
representative body, all disavowed engaging in direct lobbying or represen-
tational activities on the FTT. Both the former long-serving Minister for
Finance (Michael Noonan TD) and senior oﬃcials in the Department of
Finance aﬃrm that no overt lobbying took place. The International Financial
Services (IFS) Industry Advisory Committee (IAC), also known as the Financial
Services Industry Group, provided a likely forum for the exercise of insider
inﬂuence or ‘club governance’.3 But the puzzle remains as to why both
policy oﬃcials and government decision-makers proved so amenable to the
industry’s priorities and preferences.
Policy oﬃcials and government decisions
Policymakers and politicians genuinely examined the pros and cons of the
proposed FTT: Ireland held the Presidency of the Council of the EU between
January and June 2013, and it was then-Finance Minister Noonan who put
the issue on the European agenda. An oﬃcial who worked in the Finance
Department during this time conﬁrms that the FTT ‘looked like something
Ireland might potentially be interested in doing… I think everyone agrees
that they are good lofty ideals and there was nothing that anyone had
against them’ (Interview 3). A former government minister said that: ‘we
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didn’t oppose (the FTT) in Ireland on principle. We wanted to see what the
competitive implications would be’ (Interview 12).
As we have already noted, the report commissioned by the government
signalled caution about the FTT primarily on grounds of the potential
revenue yield, and also because of uncertainty about the eﬀects it might
have on ﬁrms’ behaviour. Policy-makers kept a watchful eye on what was hap-
pening elsewhere: if there was general adoption, they would have accepted
the FTT.
We would have no problem with it if it had international support – ideally not
just from the EU, because the US, Canada, Singapore, other countries were
important too. The next best would have been an EU-wide involvement…
(Interview 12).
However, as it transpired, ‘the UK came out against it…We decided we
couldn’t move unless London moved’ (Interview12). Once it was clear that
enhanced cooperation would be difﬁcult to attain, as an industry fund
manager commented, ‘FTT was a great idea and everybody jumped on the
bus. And when they realised exactly where the bus was taking them… they
had to ﬁgure out… how they could get off the bus’ (Interview 13). A senior
ofﬁcial conﬁrmed that:
Over time it became clear that Ireland did not want to proceed with enhanced
cooperation and did not enter the group of eleven…We are a small open
economy. We have to be alert to competitive threats. If the UK and Luxembourg
stayed out of it, it was better for us to stay out of it too (Interview 3).4
What did this competitiveness threat amount to? Behind the speciﬁc consider-
ations concerning the FTT lay the more enduring (or paradigmatic) Irish policy
stance, unchallenged by any of the major political parties, supporting tax
incentives as a principal component of attracting FDI. A former government
minister noted this (a point reiterated by several interviewees):
Competitiveness is not about the trading eﬀect on individual ﬁrms. It’s about
attracting new ﬁrms, or more investment from existing international ﬁrms.
The advantage for Ireland (in relation to the FTT) is in being a tax-free location
(Interview 12).
Once the Irish policy ofﬁcials could see that the FTT would not gain majority
traction across the EU, they moved to what might be seen as Ireland’s default
position in favour of lower taxation. Central to this is the need to maintain
their commitment to the ‘credibility’ of policy continuity and symbolic ‘signal-
ling’ of pro-business priorities. This was the ideational framework that proved
decisive.5 An ofﬁcial at the Department of Finance states that:
our model to a large extent, this is both ﬁnancial services and tax, is very sub-
stantially reliant on whether we have certainty with businesses. And we try to
give that to the greatest extent possible (Interview 14).
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An IDA ofﬁcial conﬁrms that ‘when you are talking to multinationals who are
dealing across local borders, a lot of the issue is ensuring that there is no
additional tax… getting certainty in advance on how particular transactions
will be dealt with’ (Interview 6). A senior industrial policy ofﬁcial argues that
the plans for introducing an FTT were not adopted because ‘[Ireland] is a
policy-literate country, we are policy-intelligent. Policymakers have a
healthy scepticism, cynicism, against these proposals [FTT] made for ideologi-
cal reasons’ (Interview 5). This is an almost perfect example of power over
ideas (Implication A in Table 1): the ability to present self-interest as ‘regulat-
ory common sense’ and to frame the alternative view as ‘ideological’, driven
by political motivation rather than economic rationality (Carstensen and
Schmidt 2016; Mügge 2013).
And yet the failure of the Robin Hood Campaign to mobilise public opinion
behind the FTT did not necessarily betoken the victory of ﬁnancial sector pre-
ferences in all cases in which policy instruments were contested. A political
response can be provoked if an issue concerning the privileged treatment
of ﬁnance can be proﬁled credibly. For instance, the issue of the tax treatment
of property funds gained serious traction in the political and electoral sphere
in 2016. The collapse of the property market had drawn a new surge of mostly
foreign investors into distressed property-based assets, often using rather
obscure tax shelters and availing of the privileged tax treatment of
managed funds, and engaging in active lobbying for maximally favourable
operating conditions (McDonald 2017). Government welcomed this because
it facilitated disposal of the loan book of the state’s bad bank, the National
Asset Management Agency (NAMA) (Storey 2016). However, the government
was eventually obliged to legislate to increase the tax liabilities of foreign-
owned property funds in the Finance Act 2016 (Chartered Accountants
Ireland 2017; O’Donovan 2016).
The reasons why this came about underscore the weakness in the idea-
tional resources available to the Robin Hood Tax campaign. ‘Vulture fund’
speculative activity was clearly linked with the rapidly growing, visible, and
highly salient homelessness crisis. Newspapers and other media were actively
covering the issue of vulture funds; the matter was taken up by policy entre-
preneurs in the political sphere. The terms of disposal of mortgages to specu-
lators was then easy to ‘sell’ as highly problematic to an increasingly irate
electorate.
Ideational contestation on a policy instrument, once it became politically
salient, produced legislative results, which could be understood in terms of
Implication B in Table 1. However, the scope of the new legislation was actu-
ally rather limited in its substantive consequences.6 It did almost nothing to
limit the scope of the activities of the vulture funds themselves, or to
strengthen the rights of tenants or of holders of distressed mortgages sold
on by banks or by NAMA. The 2016 legislation amounted rather to a
1614 N. HARDIMAN AND S. METINSOY
change in the ‘settings of the instruments’, the lightest layer of Hall’s typology
and Implication C on our Table 1, rather than a substantive change to the
instrument itself; meanwhile, the basic paradigm was unshaken.
Conclusion
Returning to our model in Table 1, our argument is that the formation of
national preferences in the context of EU policy initiatives is more complex
than is typically thought. This paper has sought to ﬁll an explanatory gap in
accounting for the manner in which ﬁnancial industry interests may be trans-
lated into the policy domain such as to result in a convergence of priorities
between government and industry in national preference formation. Taking
Ireland as a least-likely case, because structural and lobbying arguments
seem able to do most of the explanatory work, we argue that an explanatory
gap remains, and that ideas and motivations remain crucially important.
To understand the mechanisms at work, we considered the points of con-
vergence and divergence between the ideas and preferences of public
oﬃcials and industry interests. By teasing out the role of ideas that are in
play at diﬀerent levels of a dominant policy paradigm, we gain a new
insight into the terms on which ﬁnancial interests can exercise political
inﬂuence.
The key argument is that the apparent alignment of national interests with
industry preferences in this case comes not from state capture but works
through a diﬀerent pathway. The dominant policy paradigm is grounded in
a commitment to a developmental strategy that prioritises credibility and
stability of commitments on tax and regulation, but that is not averse to
coordination and collective action on an international scale where appropri-
ate political and legislative supports are in place.
We ﬁnd that contestation of policy ideas remains possible at all levels, but
that the role of policy entrepreneurs in moving issues into the public and elec-
toral domain is itself conditional. And ﬁnally, even on issues that have con-
siderable salience (ﬁnancial crises, homelessness), mobilising an alternative
ideational framework can have diﬀerential success, depending on how easy
it is to ﬁlter it through the weight of the dominant policy paradigm.
Notes
1. The sector has grown remarkably quickly since 2010. The industry group Inter-
national Finance Services Ireland (IFSI) states that the country has ‘ … particular
strengths in Hedge Funds (40% of the world’s Hedge Funds are serviced in
Ireland)’ (Irish Financial Services 2017). The value of assets invested via Irish dom-
iciled money market and investment funds was €2.7 trillion in late 2015, 12.5
times the entire Irish GDP (IMF 2016). The total value of assets in the ﬁnancial
sector is €4,597 trillion, €2,858 trillion of which is shadow banking (Central
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Statistics Oﬃce 2016). The total European share of managed investment funds is
estimated at some €14 trillion: Ireland’s share of these is about €2 trillion, or 15%
(Interview 8). As the IMF puts it: ‘Ireland is now the domicile of choice for more
money market and hedge fund assets than any other country in the euro area’
(IMF 2016).
2. In Ireland, 21% of respondents were ‘totally in favour’ of a tax on ﬁnancial trans-
actions, while 26% were’ fairly in favour’. 12% said they were ‘fairly opposed’ to
such tax, and 21% ‘totally opposed’ (Eurobarometer 2012). Among those who
favoured the tax, the most popular reason for support was to ‘make ﬁnancial
players contribute to the costs of the crisis’ (59%), followed by ‘combat excessive
speculation and so help future crisis’ (25%). However, 66% of the total European
population expressed support for a European-wide FTT, compared with less than
half in Ireland.
3. Access to the minutes of meetings of the executive of the IAC proved to be pro-
blematic. Summaries were reported to have been posted online in a move to
make the functioning of this body more transparent, but the documents were
missing. Neither Department of Finance oﬃcials nor industry representatives
were responsive to repeated requests for documentary records.
4. Brexit makes this argument all the more compelling. A 2017 Department of
Finance report notes that ﬁnancial services are highly exposed to the British
market. Irish exports to the UK account for 10% of Ireland’s exports and 19%
of total services exports. Compared with other European countries, Ireland is
in the upper range of the most exposed countries in a number of service
sectors. Looking at the size exposure for Financial Services, at 2.7%, the impor-
tance of this sector’s exports to the UK for Ireland’s total services export portfolio
is only exceeded by that of Luxembourg, at 7%. On the proportional exposure
measure, 33% of Ireland’s Financial Services exports are to the UK (Smith et al.
2017, p. 19).
5. This commitment is further bolstered by reluctance among oﬃcials to using a
tax for ostensibly regulatory purposes. A tax oﬃcial in IDA argues that ‘First
and foremost, [taxation] is about raising money to pay for what you want to
do in society. You could get returns, do not get me wrong, but often what
you get is market distortion’ (Interview 14).
6. ‘Finance Act 2016 introduced rules for a taxing method for fund structures
where at least 25% of the value of the fund is made up of Irish real estate.
Irish Real Estate Funds (IREF) must deduct 20% withholding tax on certain prop-
erty distributions from the fund’ (Chartered Accountants Ireland 2017).
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Appendix
List of interviewees and their aﬃliations.
Interviewee number Organization/ role Date of interview
1 Financial services derivatives sales trader 1 June 2017
2 Financial services tax consultant, large accountancy ﬁrm 15 June 2017
3 Financial services FTT adviser, large accountancy ﬁrm 15 June 2017
4 Financial consultant 12 June 2017
5 IDA oﬃcial (ﬁnancial services) 20 June 2017
6 IDA oﬃcial (tax) 20 June 2017
7 Industry body 12 June 2017
8 Dept of Finance oﬃcial 12 June 2017
9 NGO – Robin Hood Tax campaign 9 June 2017
10 Statistician, ﬁnancial services, CSO 14 June 2017
11 Statistician, tax, CSO 14 June 2017
12 Former Government Minister 28 June 2017
13 Fund Representative 19 July 2017
14 Senior Department of Finance oﬃcial 19 July 2017
15 Senior Department of Finance oﬃcial 19 July 2017
16 Industry Support Representative 25 July 2017
17 Elected national politician 26 July 2017
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